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In this interesting paper, Hyde (2011)
summarized the current debate surround-
ing non-symbolic numerical abilities in
human and non-human species. Evidence
collected in the fields of cognitive, devel-
opmental, and comparative psychology
supports the idea of two different numer-
ical systems that exist in the absence of
language: a precise object tracking sys-
tem (OTS) for small numbers—which is
supposed to support the accurate enumer-
ation of small sets (≤4) without serial
counting (subitizing)—and an approxi-
mate number system (ANS) for larger
numbers based on analogmagnitudes. The
lack of a ratio effect is considered to be the
main signature that allows experimental
differentiation of the OTS from the ANS
(Feigenson et al., 2004; Agrillo et al., 2012):
in a few words, our accuracy is similar
when we are required to discriminate one
vs. four or three vs. four items (due to the
OTS), whereas we are muchmore accurate
in discriminating 6 from 24 than 18 from
24 items (due to the ANS).
However, while the existence of the
ANS is generally accepted, researchers tend
to disagree on whether a distinct, precise
system really operates within 3–4 units
(Ansari et al., 2007; Hyde and Spelke,
2009; vanMarle and Wynn, 2009; Agrillo
et al., 2012). To explain the inconsistency
reported in the literature, Hyde hypoth-
esized that the ANS may be recruited
to represent small numbers and that
the limits of attentional resources and
working memory would play a key role
in determining which of the two sys-
tems would be employed in the small
number range. Several lines of evidence
indeed support his view. A very recent
study, however, has provided new insights
into the issue, showing that attention and
working memory are not the only factors
and prompting the inclusion of expertise
in magnitude estimation in the current
discussion.
To better understand the problem at
its core, it is important to take a page
from the ATOM theory (“a theory of
magnitude”) that Walsh (2003) advanced.
According to the author, a common mag-
nitude system located mainly in the pari-
etal lobe would process a non-symbolic
estimation of time, space, and num-
bers. One potential prediction of this
theory would be that increased abili-
ties in one domain should correlate with
increased abilities in another. In this sense,
experts in one domain (i.e., time estima-
tion) should exhibit better performance
in tasks that are not directly related to
their domain of expertise (i.e., spatial or
numerical estimation) given the existence
of a singular cognitive system applied
to these three magnitudes. To test this
hypothesis, Agrillo and Piffer (2012) com-
pared the performance of musicians and
non-musicians in temporal, spatial, and
numerical discrimination tasks where ver-
bal processing of the stimuli was exper-
imentally prevented. Musicians proved
to be better able to discriminate not
only temporal dimensions but also spatial
and numerical dimensions, supporting the
idea of a general magnitude system.
In particular, a different pattern of
data was observed within and beyond
the subitizing range. Musicians were more
accurate in the large number range,
suggesting that musical training might
have led to an increased precision of
the ANS. However, musicians’ perfor-
mance in the subitizing range showed ratio
dependence—the typical signature of the
ANS—as their accuracy decreased when
the numerical ratio between the small and
large numbers increased. The most likely
explanation is that musicians have adopted
the trained ANS even in the small num-
ber range. As a control test showed that
the two groups did not differ in atten-
tion and working memory, the activation
of the ANS in the subitizing range seems to
be due to the different levels of expertise.
It is interesting to note that expertise did
not improve the OTS. After all, the OTS
is believed to afford numerical comparison
only indirectly through one-to-one corre-
spondence (Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994), and
therefore, it might not appear surprising
that the OTS is not included in the com-
mon system for time, space, and numbers.
In this sense, musical training could not
improve the OTS.
It is currently unknown as to how
exactly expertise contributes to increased
use of the ANS in the small number range.
One hypothesis is that utilizing the ANS
might not be an effect of expertise so
much as an effect of acuity, which exper-
tise may influence. Conversely, it might be
that experts’ regular use of the ANS makes
it more likely to be engaged regardless of
how accurate the ANS really is. The for-
mer hypothesis can actually be tested by
correlating the slope of the ratio effect in
the small number range with the overall
accuracy of participants. As no correla-
tion was found (p > 0.05) in the sample
that Agrillo and Piffer (2012) tested, the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org March 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 73 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Agrillo One vs. two numerical systems?
latter hypothesis seems to be more likely:
expert musicians may recruit the trained
ANS regardless of its accuracy. To assess
whether the same conclusions can be gen-
eralized to other data sets, such an anal-
ysis should be encouraged in studies in
which participants have different levels of
expertise.
The conclusions of this study evi-
dently must be analyzed not only within
the theoretical framework of ATOM but
also within the debate surrounding non-
symbolic numerical abilities: expertise in
temporal, spatial, or numerical domains is
yet another contextual factor that might
determine the activation of the ANS in
the small number range. It is known that
expertise may lead to exceptional perfor-
mance and may determine the consistent
modification of neuro-cognitive systems,
although not necessarily those related to
the main domain of expertise (Gauthier
et al., 2000). As far as I can see, however,
this variable has seldom been taken into
account in the literature on this topic.
Of course, further studies are neces-
sary to shed light on the exact role of
extensive training in magnitude estima-
tion. With respect to this point, DeWind
and Brannon (2012) have recently admin-
istered to participants a simple numerical
training and discovered an improved abil-
ity in a numerical but not in a spatial
task. This is in line with a weaker ver-
sion of ATOM according to which space,
time, and numbers would be at least par-
tially differentiated. It is worth noting that
the training that DeWind and Brannon
(2012) set up lasted 2 weeks, well below
the level of expertise that Agrillo and
Piffer (2012) investigated in the temporal
domain (all musicians had conservatory
of music degrees and had played musi-
cal instruments for at least 12 years). It
is possible that only long-term training
can shape the common magnitude system
in the way that Agrillo and Piffer (2012)
hypothesized. Also, a large debate exists as
to whether mathematical achievement is
positively correlated to the precision of our
ANS (Halberda et al., 2008; Ranzini, 2010;
Libertus et al., 2012) or not (Castronovo
and Göbel, 2012). Regardless of these
questions, the ratio dependence that musi-
cians exhibit in the small number range
(Agrillo and Piffer, 2012) is worth noting
and suggests the possibility that expertise
in magnitude estimation might be suffi-
cient to generate increased reliance on the
ANS, even in the absence of the memory
and attentional demands that Hyde (2011)
noted.
Many questions still persist, but one
thing is certain: The “trinity” of magni-
tudes that Walsh (2003) advanced seems
to have tripled the problems for scien-
tists who work in just one of the above-
mentioned fields (temporal, spatial, and
numerical cognition).
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